加拿大温哥华论文代写:术语开始

Keywords:加拿大温哥华论文代写:术语开始

让我们从一些术语开始。一个世界(或者可能的世界——对我来说，“可能是多余的”)首先是一个个体或单一实体，而不是一个集合或类。其次，它是一种特殊的东西，而不是一种财产或普遍的东西。第三，它是具体的，因为它在所有的质量和方面都是完全确定的。最后但并非最不重要的是，一个相互联系的最大的整体和每个世界都是内部结合的，无法接近或与其他世界隔离。至少有一个世界;我们只是世界的一部分。这是一个具体的世界，如果没有“岛屿宇宙”，那就是现实世界。“不真实的世界(如果有的话)是可能的。”一个关于可能世界的现实主义者认为，只要有可能，就会有许多陈腐的世界，或者可能会有许多其他的世界——例如，驴会说话，猪会飞——在一个世界里，它是真实的。对于可能的世界，有很多方法可以成为现实主义者。现实主义者根据他们对现实的描述分为两个阵营。大卫·刘易斯认为世界在本体论上是平等的;实际的和仅仅可能的，并不完全不同，而是在它们与我们的关系上有所不同。刘易斯称之为“现实主义”。大多数哲学家接受刘易斯现实主义，如果它是真的，它会给系统哲学带来实质性的理论回报。另一方面，很少有哲学家有这种渴望或有能力去相信它。通常，对信仰的阻碍是一种假设性和本体论上的奢靡，它伴随着任何关于可能世界的成熟现实主义:相信会说话的驴和会飞的猪——即使它们在时间上和时间上是我们无法接近的——被简单地认为是令人无法容忍的。但根据菲利普·贝克尔的观点，这种反对是基于沙文主义、偏见，而非争论;这并不是一种集体价值的偏见。然而，与刘易斯的现实主义观点相反，则是另一回事。贝克尔认为，从理论上讲，现实性是绝对的，而非相对的，而且，现实性和纯粹可能性之间的区别在于本体论状态的不同:任何与现实事物具有同样基本类型的本体论事物，其本质都是真实的。当路易斯声称，术语开始菲利浦•布里克，所有的世界都是本体论上平等的，只能理解这些抗议尽管他说所有的世界都是一致真实的。但这使得刘易斯对多个世界的反抗既不连贯又不合逻辑。因此，不可能有什么好的理由相信存在多个实际的具体世界。无论如何，模态算子作为量词对现实性和广泛现实性的具体部分的精神分析都是错误的。因此，刘易斯现实主义遭到了拒绝。
加拿大温哥华论文代写:术语开始
Let’s begin with some terminology at the start. A world (or possible world-for me, the ‘possible is superfluous) is, first, an individual or single entity, not a set or class. Secondly, it is a particular, not a property or universal. Thirdly, it is concrete in a sense that it is completely determinate in all qualitative and respects. Last but not the least, a maximal interconnected whole and each world is internally combined and inaccessible or isolated from every other world. There is at least one world; we are just part of the world. It is a concrete world, the actual world if there are no “island universes.” Worlds that are not real (if any) are simply possible. A realist about possible worlds thinks that there is a platitudinous plurality of worlds or there might a number of other worlds whenever something is possible-for example, that donkeys talk, or that pigs fly-there is a world in which it is true. There is a number of ways to be a realist about possible worlds. Realists split into two camps depending upon their account of actuality. David Lewis thinks that the worlds are ontologically all on a par; the actual and the merely possible vary, not utterly, but in how they are related to us. Lewisian called this ‘realism’. Most philosophers accept that Lewisian realism, if it is true, it would bring substantial theoretical payback to systematic philosophy. On the other hand, few philosophers have been eager or able to deem it. Often the obstruction to faith is the hypothetical and ontological extravagance that escorts any full-blown realism about possible worlds: belief in talking donkeys and flying pigs-even if they are spatiotemporally and causally inaccessible from us-is deemed simply outrageous. But According to Philip Becker, that opposition is based on chauvinism, prejudice, not argument; and it is not a prejudice that has been collective value. Oppositions to Lewis’s account of realism, however, are another matter. Becker takes it to be theoretically obvious that actuality is absolute, not relative, and that, moreover, the difference between the actual and the merely possible is dissimilarity in ontological status: whatever is ontologically of the same fundamental type as something actual is being itself actual. When Lewis claims, Phillip Bricker then, that all worlds are ontologically on a par, only can understand these protests in spite of being saying that all worlds are uniformly actual. But that makes Lewis’s resistance of a plurality of worlds incoherent and illogical. For this, there could be no good reasons for believing in a plurality of actual concrete worlds. No matter how, Psychoanalysis of modal operators as quantifiers over concrete parts of actuality as well as extensive actuality are surely mistaken. Thus Lewisian realism has been rejected.